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Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment 
 
Alan Boyle* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Environmental rights do not fit neatly into any single category or "generation" of human 
rights. They can be viewed from at least three perspectives, straddling all the various 
categories or generations of human rights. First, existing civil and political rights can be 
used to give individuals, groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) access to 
environmental information, judicial remedies and political processes. On this view their 
role is one of empowerment: facilitating participation in environmental decision-making 
and compelling governments to meet minimum standards of protection for life, private 
life and property from environmental harm. A second possibility is to treat a decent, 
healthy or sound environment as an economic or social right, comparable to those whose 
progressive attainment is promoted by the 1966 United Nations (UN) Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights. The main argument for this approach is that it 
would privilege environmental quality as a value, giving it comparable status to other 
economic and social rights, such as development, and priority over non rights-based 
objectives. Like other economic and social rights, it would be programmatic and in most 
cases enforceable only through relatively weak international supervisory mechanisms. 
The third option would treat environmental quality as a collective or solidarity right, 
giving communities (“peoples”) rather than individuals a right to determine how their 
environment and natural resources should be protected and managed.  
 
The first approach is essentially anthropocentric insofar as it focuses on the harmful 
impact on individual humans rather than on the environment itself: it amounts to a 
                                                 
* Professor of Public International Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh and barrister, Essex 
Court Chambers, London. This article is based on a paper given at Fordham University Law School on 
March 2, 2007, and the author is grateful to the organizers and participants for the opportunity to 
discuss some of the issues. Research assistance was provided by Christian Schall, LLM class 2006/7. I 
am also grateful to Daniella Diz and Danielle Rached for information concerning Brazil.  
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“greening” of human rights law, rather than a law of environmental rights. The second 
comes closer to seeing the environment as a good in its own right but, nevertheless one 
that will always be vulnerable to tradeoffs against other similarly privileged but 
competing objectives, including the right to economic development.1  The third approach 
is the most contested. Not all human rights lawyers favor the recognition of third 
generation rights, arguing that they devalue the concept of human rights, and divert 
attention from the need to implement existing civil, political, economic and social rights 
fully.2 The concept hardly featured in the agenda of the 1993 UN World Conference on 
Human Rights, and in general it adds little to an understanding of the nature of 
environmental rights, which are not inherently collective in character. However, there 
are some significant examples of collective rights that in certain contexts can have 
environmental implications, such as the protection of minority cultures and indigenous 
peoples,3 or the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources, which 
was recognised in the 1966 U.N. Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,4 and in the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights.5  
 
                                                 
1 Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA Res. 41/128 (1986), Article 2(3); Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, Principle 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (June 14, 1992) [hereinafter 
Rio Declaration]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 
1(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976). The “right to development” embraces not just the promotion 
of economic development by states but also the broader human development elements found in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 
1966); the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, and the Millennium Development Goals, 
UNGA Res. 55/2 (2000).  See generally A.Rosas, The Right to Development, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS 119-21 (A.Eide et al. eds, 2001); DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
(B.A.Andreassen and S.P.Marks eds., 2006); J.Merrills, Environmental Rights, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 663 (D.Bodansky, J.Brunnée and E.Hey eds, 2007). 
2 See Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 
607 (1984); I.Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES  
(James Crawford ed., 1988). 
3 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 27 (stating that minorities 
have the right to enjoy their own culture); id. at art. 47 (stating that they may exploit their natural 
resources).  See generally Int’l Lab. Org., Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Indep. Countries, No. 169 (Sept. 5, 1991). 
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, at art. 1(2); See also International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, at art. 25; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 47 (”Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted 
as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilise fully and freely their natural wealth 
and resources.”).  For drafting history of Article 1(2), see A. Cassese, The Self-determination of 
Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS – THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
(L.Henkin ed., 1981); A. Rosas, supra note 1 (notes that Article 1 “establishes minimum rules for the 
right of the entire population to economic and social rights against its own government.”). 
5 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 21, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 
58 (June 27, 1981).  
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Put simply, the question addressed in this paper is the following:  should we continue 
to think about human rights and the environment within the existing framework of 
human rights law in which the protection of humans is the central focus – essentially a 
greening of the rights to life, private life, and property – or has the time come to talk 
directly about environmental rights- in other words a right to have the environment 
itself protected? Should we transcend the anthropocentric in favor of the eco-centric? 
 
The question is not a new one. Thirty-five years ago at the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, the international community declared 
“[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations.”6 This grand statement might have provided the basis for 
subsequent elaboration of a human right to environmental quality,7 but its real-world 
impact has been noticeably modest. It was not repeated in the 1992 Rio Declaration, 
which makes human beings “the central concern of sustainable development” and 
refers only to their being “entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with 
nature.”8 As Dinah Shelton noted at the time, the Rio Declaration's failure to give 
greater emphasis to human rights was indicative of uncertainty and debate about the 
proper place of human rights law in the development of international environmental law.9  
Fifteen years later there is still room for debate. 
 
Among human rights treaties only the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights proclaims environmental rights in broadly qualitative terms.  It protects both 
the right of peoples to the “best attainable standard of health”10 and their right to “a 
general satisfactory environment favorable to their development.”11 In the Ogoniland 
case the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights concluded that ‘an 
environment degraded by pollution and defaced by the destruction of all beauty and 
                                                 
6 Stockholm Dec’l on the Human Env’t, Princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972); see 
Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423, 451-54 
(1973).  
7 See Sohn, supra note 6 (arguing that Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration creates this kind of 
individual human right).  
8 Rio Declaration, supra note 1, at Principle 1.  
9 Dinah L. Shelton, What Happened in Rio to Human Rights?, 3 Y.B. OF INT’L ENV. L. 75, 82 (1992). 
10 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 5, at art. 16. 
11 Id. at art. 24. 
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variety is as contrary to satisfactory living conditions and development as the 
breakdown of the fundamental ecologic equilibria is harmful to physical and moral 
health’.12 It held, inter alia, that Article 24 of the Charter imposes an obligation on the 
State to take reasonable measures “to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to 
promote conservation, and to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources.”13 Specific actions required of States in fulfilment of Articles 16 and 
24 include ‘ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of 
threatened environments, requiring and publicising environmental and social impact 
studies prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring 
and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and 
activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to 
participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.’14. The 
Commission’s final order is also the most far-reaching of any environmental rights 
case. It calls for a ‘comprehensive cleanup of lands and rivers damaged by oil 
operations,’ the preparation of environmental and social impact assessments, and 
provision of information on health and environmental risks and ‘meaningful access to 
regulatory and decision-making bodies.’15 As Shelton observes, ‘The result offers a 
blueprint for merging environmental protection, economic development, and 
guarantees of human rights.’16 
 
Ogoniland is a remarkable decision that goes further than any other in the substantive 
environmental obligations it places on states. It is unique in applying for the first time 
the right of peoples to dispose freely of their own natural resources.17  When 
combined with the evidence of severe harm to the lives, health, property and well-
                                                 
12 Para. 51. See K.S.A. Ebeku, The right to a satisfactory environment and the African Commission,  3 
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL 149 (2003) at 163; J.C. Nwobike, The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Demystification of Second and Third Generation Rights under the 
African Charter, 1 AFRICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 129 (2005) at 139. 
13 Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, ¶¶ 52-53, available 
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/155-96.html; see generally Dinah L. Shelton, 
Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 (Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr./Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. 
Rights v. Nigeria). Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 937 (2002). 
14 Soc. And Econ. Rights Action Ctr., OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, at ¶ 54. 
15 Id. at ¶ 69. 
16 Shelton, supra note 13, at 942. 
17 But see Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, at art. 1 (“All peoples may, for 
their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources . . . .”).  However, Article 1 is not 
justiciable by the Human Rights Commission under the procedure for individual complaints laid down 
in the Optional Protocol.  See Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Commc’n 167/1984, ¶ 32.1, U.N. Doc. 
Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990). 
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being of the local population, the decision can be seen as a challenge to the 
sustainability of oil extraction in Ogoniland. The most obvious characteristics of 
unsustainable development include material harm and a lack of material benefits for 
those most adversely affected. In that sense it is not surprising that the African 
Commission does not see this case simply as a failure to maintain a fair balance 
between public good and private rights. This decision gives some indication of how 
environmental rights could be used, but its exceptional basis in Articles 21 and 24 has 
to be remembered. No other treaty contains anything directly comparable. Moreover, 
the rights created by the African Convention are peoples’ rights, not individual rights.  
 
 However, in somewhat similar circumstances, the Inter-American Commission 
and Court of Human Rights have interpreted the rights to life, health and property 
afford protection from environmental destruction and unsustainable development and 
they go some way towards achieving the same outcome as Article 24 of the African 
Convention.18 In the Maya Indigenous Community of Toledo Case,19 the Inter 
American Commission (‘IACHR’) accepted that logging concessions threatened long-
term and irreversible damage to the natural environment on which the petitioners’ 
system of subsistence agriculture depended. Loss of topsoil would prevent forest 
regeneration, damaging water supplies, and diminishing the availability of wildlife and 
plants. Citing Ogoniland, the IACHR concluded that there had been violations of the 
petitioners’ right to property in their ancestral land. Its final order required Belize to 
repair the environmental damage and to take measures to demarcate and protect their 
land in consultation with the community. The Commission’s decision notes the 
importance of economic development but reiterates that ‘development activities must 
be accompanied by appropriate and effective measures to ensure that they do not 
proceed at the expense of the fundamental rights of persons who may be particularly 
and negatively affected, including indigenous communities and the environment upon 
                                                 
18 See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. V. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 
31, 2001); Maya Indigenous Cmty. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report 
No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004). Several other claims have been held 
admissible, including Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. of the Enxet-Lengua People v. Paraguay, Case 
12.313, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 2/02, Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 387 (2002), and Kichwa Peoples of the 
Sarayaku Cmty. & Its Members v. Ecuador, Case 167/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/04, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 308 (2004). 
19 Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Report No. 40/04, 
IACHR, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004). 
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which they depend for their physical, cultural and spiritual well-being.’20  Unlike the 
Ogoniland case, however, these IACHR decisions draw heavily on the particular 
rights of indigenous peoples to their traditional lands, and it is unclear whether they 
have more general relevance outside that context. 
 
Most human rights treaties either make no explicit reference to the environment at all 
– such as the European Convention on Human Rights21 – or they do so only in 
relatively narrow terms focused on human health,22 and it is doubtful whether the 
latter agreements add anything to the case law derived from the right to life.23  There is 
one notable exception: the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,24 
whose preamble not only recalls Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration and 
recognizes that “adequate protection of the environment is essential to human well-
being and the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to life itself”25 but 
also asserts that “every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his 
or her health and well-being, and the duty, both individually and in association with 
others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future 
generations.”26  
 
However, the focus of the Aarhus Convention is strictly procedural in content, limited 
to public participation in environmental decision-making, access to justice and 
                                                 
20 See e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
Art. 12 (Dec. 16, 1966); European Social Charter art. 11, Oct. 18, 1961, E.T.S. No. 035, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 
(1961); Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 17, 1988, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. 
GAOR Supp, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).  For fuller discussion of these treaty provisions, see 
Robin Churchill, Environmental Rights in Existing Human Rights Treaties, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ch. 5 (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996).  
21 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights). 
22 See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
Art. 12 (Dec. 16, 1966); European Social Charter art. 11, Oct. 18, 1961, E.T.S. No. 035, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 
(1961); Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 17, 1988, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. 
GAOR Supp, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989); See also Robin Churchill, Environmental Rights in 
Existing Human Rights Treaties, in Boyle & Anderson, supra note 20, at 89-108. 
23 See infra, section 3. 
24 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, UN Doc. ECE/CEP/43, 38 I.L.M. 517 [hereinafter Aarhus 
Convention].  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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information.27 As a conception of environmental rights, it owes little to Stockholm 
Principle 1 and everything to Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which gives 
explicit support in mandatory language to the same category of procedural rights.28 
The Aarhus Convention is widely ratified in Europe and has had significant influence 
on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, whose decisions are 
considered below. The Aarhus Convention is important in the present debate because, 
unlike the ECHR, it gives particular emphasis to public interest activism by NGOs.29 
Moreover, it also applies, with some important qualifications, to plans, policies and 
legislation. Ultimately, it is public participation at this level, rather than at the project 
level to which Article 6 applies, that has the greatest potential to promote environmental 
protection.30 But as one critic has pointed out, while the Convention endorses the right 
to live in an adequate environment, it “stops short, however, of providing the means 
for citizens directly to invoke this right.”31  
  
If Stockholm did little for the development of international environmental rights, it 
may have had greater impact on national law. Environmental provisions of some kind 
have been added to an increasing number of constitutions since 1972. Some clearly 
create no rights of any kind. For example, Article 37 of the European Union’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights merely provides that “[a] high level of environmental 
protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated 
into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of 
                                                 
27 See J. Ebbesson, The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law, 8 Y.B. OF 
INT’L ENV. L. 51 (1997). 
28 Rio Declaration, supra note 1.  Principle 10 provides that “[e]nvironmental issues are best handled 
with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual 
shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to 
participate in decision-making processes.  States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available.  Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.”  See also United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, ch. 23.2. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (June 
14, 1992). 
29 Aarhus Convention, supra note 24, at art. 4(1)(a), 6 and 9.  Article 6 is amended by Decision II/1 of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties, 
ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.2 (May 27, 2005) (Genetically Modified Organisms). 
30 See arts. 7 and 8. Despite its ‘soft’ wording (‘endeavour to provide opportunities for public 
participation…’) the Compliance Committee has found at least one state in breach of art.7: Dalma 
Orchards - Findings and Recommendations with regard to compliance by Armenia 
(Comm.ACCC/C/2004/08) U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2006/2/Add.1 (10 May 2006). See also 
Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/2003/2 (May 21, 2003). 
31
 TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 180 (2005). 
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sustainable development.”32 Similarly, under the heading “Directive Principles of 
State Policy,” Article 48A of the Indian Constitution provides only that “The state 
shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests 
and wild life of the country.”33 This article obviously creates no enforceable rights 
but, unlike the EU Charter, it has encouraged Indian courts to give other human rights, 
including the right to life, a very vigorous environmental interpretation.34 The result 
has been a jurisprudence, which, more than in any other country, uses human rights 
law to address questions of environmental quality.35 Some constitutions draw 
inspiration from Article 12 of the 1966 UN Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Thus, Article 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea 
declares that “[a]ll citizens shall have the right to a healthy and pleasant 
environment,” but it then goes on to say that the substance of this right shall be 
determined by legislation.36  This need not stop Korean courts from “greening” other 
human rights, however. 
 
Other constitutions give the environment a stronger human rights focus. Article 45 of 
the Spanish Constitution declares that everyone has “the right to enjoy an 
environment suitable for the development of the person as well as the duty to preserve 
it.”37 It then directs public authorities to concern themselves with “the rational use of 
                                                 
32 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The Future of Environmental Rights in the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 531-549 (Philip Alston ed., 1999). 
33 INDIA CONST. art. 48A.  See also  CONSTITUTION OF THE P.R.OF CHINA, art. 9 (1982) (“The state 
ensures the rational use of natural resources and protects rare animals and plants. Appropriation or 
damaging of natural resources by any organization or individual by whatever means is prohibited.”); 
and  art. 26  (“The state protects and improves the environment in which people live and the ecological 
environment. It prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.  The state organizes and 
encourages afforestation and the protection of forests.”). 
34 See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 150-1 (Michael Anderson & 
Paolo Galizzi eds., 2002) (on the use of “directive principles” in Indian case law). 
35 See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India 3 S.C.C. 161 (1984); M.C Mehta v. Union of India 2 
SCC 353 (1997); Jagganath v. Union of India  2 S.C.C. 87 (1997). In Francis Coralie Mullin v.  
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 529, the Supreme Court declared “[t]he 
right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes with it, namely, the bare 
necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and 
expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow 
human beings.  The magnitude and components of this right would depend upon the extent of 
economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the bare necessi-
ties of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum 
expression of the human self.” For a recent overview of all the Indian case law, see Jona Razzaque, 
Human Rights and the Environment: The National Experience in South Asia and Africa, Joint UNEP-
OHCHR Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment: Background Paper No. 4, 14-16 
(January 2002). 
36 Constitution of the Republic of Korea, art. 35. 
37 Spanish Constitution, art. 45. 
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all natural resources for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of life 
and protecting and restoring the environment….”38 Article 225 of the Brazilian 
Constitution declares that “[e]veryone has the right to an ecologically balanced 
environment which is an asset of common use and essential to a healthy quality of 
life, and both the Government and the community shall have the duty to defend and 
preserve [it] for present and future generations.”39 It then sets out in some detail the 
principal environmental responsibilities of the state.40 Article 56 of the Turkish 
Constitution is similar: “Everyone has the right to live in a healthy, balanced 
environment. It [shall be] the duty of the [S]tate and the citizens to improve [and 
preserve] the natural environment . . . and to prevent environmental pollution.”41 
Article 42 of the 1993 Russian Constitution confers on everyone “the right to a 
favourable environment, reliable information about its condition and to compensation 
for the damage caused to his or her health or property by ecological violations.”42 The 
1996 South African Constitution gives everyone the right “to an environment that is 
not harmful to their health or well-being; and to have the environment protected, for 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Brazilian Federal Constitution, art. 225. This is not just a collective right; an individual can also 
bring an environmental claim. See id. at art. 5 (“[a]ny citizen is a legitimate party to file a people's legal 
action with a view to nullifying an act injurious to the public property or to the property of an entity in 
which the State participates, to the administrative morality, to the environment and to the historic and 
cultural heritage….”). 
40 Id., art. 225.  Including, inter alia, the following: 
Paragraph 1 - In order to ensure the effectiveness of this right, it is incumbent upon the Government to: 
I - preserve and restore the essential ecological processes and provide for the ecological treatment of 
species and ecosystems; 
II - preserve the diversity and integrity of the genetic patrimony of the country and to control entities 
engaged in research and manipulation of genetic material; 
III - define, in all units of the Federation, territorial spaces and their components which are to receive 
special protection. any alterations and suppressions being allowed only by means of law, and any use 
which may harm the integrity of the attributes which justify their protection being forbidden; 
IV - require, in the manner prescribed by law, for the installation of works and activities which may 
potentially cause significant degradation of the environment, a prior environmental impact study, which 
shall be made public; 
V - control the production, sale and use of techniques, methods or substances which represent a risk to 
life, the quality of life and the environment; 
VI - promote environment education in all school levels and public awareness of the need to preserve 
the environment; 
VII - protect the fauna and the flora, with prohibition, in the manner prescribed by law, of all practices 
which represent a risk to their ecological function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to 
cruelty. 
. . .  
Paragraph 4 - The Brazilian Amazonian Forest, the Atlantic Forest, the Serra do Mar, the Pantanal 
Mato-Grossense and the coastal zone are part of the national patrimony, and they shall be used, as 
provided by law, under conditions which ensure the preservation of the environment, therein included 
the use of mineral resources.  
41 Turkish Constitution,  art. 56 ;  See also Taskin v. Turkey, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 50. 
42 Constitution of the Russian Federation, art. 42. 
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the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promote conservation; 
and secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development.”43 This provision reflects 
Article 24 of the African Convention, and the Ogoniland decision gives some 
guidance on how it might be interpreted and applied.44  
 
Some of these constitutions, including those of India, Korea, and the EU, address the 
responsibilities of government without necessarily creating justiciable environmental 
rights, although they may nevertheless influence the interpretation and application of 
other constitutional rights or of general law. They do not appear to create an 
autonomous right to an environment of any particular quality, although they plainly 
place a responsibility on government to protect the environment. In other cases, a 
stronger rights-based interpretation is possible, and the important question is the scope 
and extent of the protection afforded to the environment. The Spanish, Brazilian, 
Turkish, Russian and South African constitutional provisions suggest that in those 
jurisdictions there is some form of right to environmental quality along the lines 
foreseen at Stockholm, although much will depend on how national courts interpret 
and use them. Many other national legal systems that lack comparable constitutional 
provisions nevertheless allow quite liberal use of public interest litigation and judicial 
review in environmental cases.45 This is particularly true of common law countries 
such as the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and India. As noted above, it is also a trend 
encouraged by the Aarhus Convention.46 Stockholm Principle 1 may thus have had a 
broader influence on national law than a survey of constitutions alone would suggest. 
 
                                                 
43
 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 24. 
44 See Soc. And Econ. Rights Action Ctr., OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5. 
45 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 520 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); J.G. Miller, Case Law 
Analysis: The Standing of Citizens to enforce against violations of environmental statutes in the United 
States, 12 J. ENV. L. 370 (2000). On New Zealand, see Envtl. Def. Soc’y v. S. Pac. Aluminium, [1981] 1 
N.Z.L.R. 146 (C.A.). On India, see Rural Litig. & Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1985 
A.I.R. S.C. 652; T. Damodhar Rao v. Mun. Corp. of Hyderabad, 1987 A.I.R. S.C. 171; M.C.Mehta v. 
Union of India, 1987 1 S.C.C. 395. On Pakistan, see Shehla Zia v. WAPDA, P.L.D. 1994 S.C. 416. On 
Bangladesh, see Farooque v. Bangladesh 49 D.L.R. (A.D.) 1 (1997). On the Philippines, see Minors 
Oposa v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Env’t and Natural Res., 33 I.L.M. 173 (1994). On the Netherlands, see 
Vereniging Milieudefensie v. Hoofdingenieur - Directeur van de Rijkswaterstaat, 11 Neths. Y.B.I.L. 318 
(1980).  
46 Aarhus Convention, supra note 24. 
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Partly in response to these national developments, the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1994 proposed a 
Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment.47 This draft 
declaration offered a conception of human rights and the environment much closer to 
Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration than to Principle 1 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration. It proclaimed generally that “[a]ll persons [have the right to] a secure, 
healthy and ecologically sound environment [and to] an environment adequate to meet 
equitably the needs of present generations and that does not impair the rights of future 
generations to meet equitably their needs.”48 This right would include, inter alia, 
freedom from pollution, environmental degradation and activities that adversely affect 
the environment or sustainable development; protection and preservation of the air, soil, 
water, biological diversity and ecosystems; ecologically sound access to nature; the 
conservation and sustainable use of nature and natural resources; preservation of unique 
sites; enjoyment of traditional life and subsistence for indigenous peoples. The UN Sub-
Commission report stressed the close link between the right to a decent environment and 
the right to development, but it also relies on the indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights. This extensive and sophisticated restatement of environmental rights and 
obligations at the international level was based on a survey of national and international 
human rights law and international environmental law. The special rapporteur's most 
fundamental conclusion was that there had been “a shift from environmental law to the 
right to a healthy and decent environment.”49 
 
The main arguments the Sub-commission advanced for adopting an autonomous right to 
a healthy and decent environment are the enhanced status it would give environmental 
quality when balanced against competing objectives, and that it would recognize the vital 
character of the environment as a basic condition of life, indispensable to the promotion 
of human dignity and welfare, and to the fulfilment of other human rights.50 Their report 
                                                 
47 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of 
Minorities, Human Rights and the Environment, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, 59, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, (July 6, 1994) [hereinafter Human Rights and the Environment].  For previous 
reports, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/8; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/7, and U.N. 
Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/7. Boyle & Anderson, supra note 20, at 67-69. 
48 Human Rights and the Environment, supra note 47, at part I(4). 
49 Id. at ¶ 22. 
50 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 35 (Sept. 25) (also printed in 37 
I.L.M. 162) (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry); Raghunandan S. Pathak, The Human Rights 
System as a Conceptual Framework for Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND 
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stresses the close link between the right to a decent environment and the right to 
development, but it also relies on the indivisibility and interdependence of all human 
rights.   
 
The response of the Human Rights Commission and of states generally was not 
favourable to this approach, and the proposal has made no further progress. US and 
European opposition has been particularly strong. In an earlier paper published in 
1996,51 I argued that the elaboration of an international right to a decent environment 
was undesirable on three grounds: that it was too uncertain a concept to be of 
normative value, that it was inherently anthropocentric, and that it was unnecessary 
given the extent to which international law already addressed environmental 
problems. Other scholars have taken a similar view.52 Günther Handl argues that it is 
misconceived to assume that environmental protection is furthered by postulating a 
generic human right to the environment, in whatever form.53  He notes the difficulty of 
definition, the inefficiency of developing environmental standards in response to 
individual complaints, the inappropriateness of human rights bodies for the task of 
supervising obligations of environmental protection, and the fundamentally 
anthropocentric character of viewing environmental issues though a human rights focus, 
entailing a form of “species chauvinism.”  In this paper I do not propose to revisit each 
of these arguments, but I will review the development of the law since 1996 in order 
to see what conclusions we might reach on the question of environmental rights today.  
 
Two developments stand out. First, there is now a substantial case law on the greening 
of existing human rights – especially in Europe but also in Africa and Latin America. 
Second, rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and 
access to justice in environmental matters have been significantly strengthened by 
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, by the 1998 Aarhus Convention, and by judicial 
decisions, the effect of which is to incorporate the requirements of Principle 10 into 
                                                                                                                                            
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1993); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental 
Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991). 
51 Boyle & Anderson, supra note 20, at ch. 3. 
52 See, e.g., THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT 91-92 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy ed., 1979); Phillip 
Alston, Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 
(1984). 
53 Günther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly “Revisionist” View, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 117 (Antonio Trindade ed., 
1992). 
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existing human rights law.  What matters is whether these developments have merely 
narrowed the gap, or is there essentially no room left for the autonomous 
environmental rights advocated by the UN Sub-Commission in 1994? 
 
2. An Assessment of the Case Law 
 
What follows will concentrate on Europe, simply because that is where most of the 
cases on human rights and the environment have been decided. An important question 
considered later is whether these European developments are also indicative of how 
other treaties with similar provisions should be interpreted, including the 1966 UN 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights, adopted in 1950, says nothing about the 
environment. It is however a “living instrument,” pursuant to which changing social 
values can be reflected in the jurisprudence. The European Court of Human Rights 
has consistently held that “the Convention . . . must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions.”54  With regard to environmental rights this is exactly what 
the Court has done.  So extensive is its growing environmental jurisprudence that 
proposals for the adoption of an environmental protocol have not been pursued.55 
Instead, a Manual on Human Rights and the Environment adopted by the Council of 
Europe in 2005 recapitulates the Court’s decisions on this subject and sets out some 
general principles.56  
 
The Manual points out that “The Convention is not designed to provide a general 
protection of the environment as such and does not expressly guarantee a right to a 
                                                 
54 Soering v United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 473 (1989); See, e.g., Öcalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 10 (2003) (“capital punishment in peacetime has come to be regarded as an unacceptable, if 
not inhuman, form of punishment which is no longer acceptable under Art. 2”).  The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights takes the same approach in interpreting the San Jose Convention.  See 
Advisory Opinion on the Right to Information on Consular Assistance, 1999 Inter-Am C.H.R. (ser. A) 
No. 16 ¶¶ 114-5; Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man, 1989 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 10 ¶ 43; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. 
v Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 20 ¶¶ 146-148. 
55 See Eur. Consult. Ass. Comm. of Experts for the Dev. of Human Rights, Doc. No. DH-DEV (2005) 
[hereinafter Council of Europe Report]. 
56 Id. at Appendix II. See also Loukis Loucaides, Environmental Protection through the Jurisprudence 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 249 (2005); Richard Desgagné, 
Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention of Human Rights, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 
263 (1995). For a recent review of other international developments see Dinah Shelton, Human Rights 
and the Environment: Jurisprudence of Human Rights Bodies, 32 ENVTL. POL. & L. 158 (2002).  
  14 
sound, quiet and healthy environment.”57  Nevertheless, various articles indirectly 
have an impact on claims relating to the environment, most notably the right to life,58 
the right to respect for private and family life,59 the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions and property,60 and the right to a fair hearing.61  The Manual makes 
several points of general importance concerning the Convention’s implications for 
environmental protection.  They can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. The state has an obligation to regulate and control environmental problems 
where they impair the exercise of convention rights and to ensure that the law 
is enforced. 
2. The state also has an obligation to make available information concerning 
serious environmental risks, and to make provision for participation in 
environmental decision-making and access to justice in environmental cases. 
3. Protection of the environment is a legitimate objective that in appropriate 
cases can justify limiting certain rights, including the right to private life and 
the right to possessions and property.  When balancing environmental 
concerns against convention rights, “[t]he Court has recognized that national 
authorities are best placed to make decisions on environmental issues, which 
often have difficult social and technical aspects. Therefore in reaching its 
judgments, the Court affords the national authorities in principle a wide 
discretion . . . .”62 
4. An unsettled question not referred to in the manual is whether Convention 
rights have trans-boundary application in environmental cases.   
 
Let me examine each of these points before returning to the question of environmental 
rights per se. 
 
2.1  Regulation and control of environmental problems and law enforcement 
 
                                                 
57 See Council of Europe Report, supra note 55. 
58 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 21, at § I, art. 2. 
59 Id. at art. 8. 
60 Id. at Protocol 1, art. 1. 
61 Id. at art. 6. 
62 See Council of Europe Report, supra note 55, at 10. 
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The starting point for any discussion of human rights and the environment is that a 
failure by the state to regulate or control environmental nuisances or to protect the 
environment may interfere with individual rights.  Cases such as Guerra, Lopez 
Ostra, Öneryildiz, Taskin and Fadeyeva show how the right to private life, or the right 
to life, can be used to compel governments to regulate environmental risks, enforce 
environmental laws, or disclose information.63  All these cases have common features.  
First, there is an industrial nuisance – a chemical plant, smelter, tannery, mine or 
waste disposal site, for example.  Secondly, there is a failure to take adequate 
preventive measures to control these known sources of serious risk to life, health, 
private life or property.  The European Convention may not directly require states to 
protect the environment, but the Court’s decisions do require them to protect anyone 
whose rights are or may be seriously affected by environmental nuisances.  As the 
Court said in Fadeyeva, the state’s responsibility in environmental cases “may arise 
from a failure to regulate private industry.”64  The state thus has a duty “to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures” to secure rights under the convention. In 
Öneryildiz it emphasized that “[t]he positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to 
safeguard life for the purposes of Article 2 entails above all a primary duty on the 
State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide 
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life.”65  The Court had no doubt that 
this obligation covered the licensing, setting up, operation, security and supervision of 
dangerous activities, and required all those concerned to take “practical measures to 
ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the 
inherent risks.”66 These practical measures include law enforcement: it is a 
characteristic feature of Guerra, Lopez Ostra, Taskin and Fadeyeva that the industrial 
activities in question were either operating illegally or in violation of environmental 
laws and emissions standards. In Lopez, Ostra and Taskin the national courts had 
ordered the closure of the facility in question, but their decisions had been ignored or 
                                                 
63 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277 (1994); Guerra v. Italy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 (1998); 
Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005 IV 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10; Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004 XII 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20; 
Taskin v. Turkey, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50. 
64 Fadeyeva, 2005 IV 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10.  
65 Öneryildiz, 2004 XII  41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20, 359. 
66 Id.. For a comparable case under the Inter American Convention in which precautionary measures 
were ordered by the Inter American Commission, see Cmty. of San Mateo de Huanchor v. Peru, Case 
504/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 69/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 at 487 (2004). See also 
Maria Estela Acosta Hernandez v. Mexico, Case 11.823, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 17/03, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118 doc. 70 rev. 2 at 514 (2003) (holding a similar complaint to be inadmissible for 
delay). 
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overruled by the political authorities. In effect, there is in these cases a right to have 
the law enforced and the judgments of national courts upheld:  
 
“The Court would emphasise that the administrative authorities form one element of a 
State subject to the rule of law, and that their interests coincide with the need for the 
proper administration of justice. Where administrative authorities refuse or fail to 
comply, or even delay doing so, the guarantees enjoyed by a litigant during the judicial 
phase of the proceedings are rendered devoid of purpose.”67 
 
We can draw certain obvious conclusions from these cases. First, states have a 
positive duty to take appropriate measures to prevent industrial pollution or other 
forms of environmental nuisance from seriously interfering with health or the 
enjoyment of private life or property.68  This is not simply a responsibility which can 
be left to industry to fulfil. Its extent will of course depend on the harmfulness of the 
activity and the foreseeability of the risk.  Once the risk ought to have been foreseen 
as a result of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) or in some other way (e.g. 
an official report) then the state has a duty to take appropriate action: it cannot wait 
until the interference with health or private life has become a reality.69  In assessing 
whether a risk is foreseeable for this purpose it is quite likely that the precautionary 
principle will be relevant in situations of serious or irreversible harm, although the 
point has not so far been decided by the Court.70  Secondly, although the Court refers 
to the need to balance the rights of the individual with the needs of the community as 
a whole, in reality the states’ failure to apply or enforce their own environmental laws 
                                                 
67 Taskin, 2004-X 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50, 1150. The Inter American Court of Human Rights has taken the 
same view pursuant to Article 25 of the Inter American Convention, see Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 201, at ¶¶ 106-14 ( 2001). 
68 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277 (1994); Guerra, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357; Fadeyeva, 2005-IV 45 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 10; Öneryildiz, 2004-XII 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20; Taskin, 2004-X 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50, 1150.  
See also Maya Indigenous Cmty. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 727 ¶ 47(holding that “the State failed to put into place 
adequate safeguards and mechanisms, to supervise, monitor and ensure that it had sufficient staff to 
oversee that the execution of the logging concessions would not cause further environmental damage to 
Maya lands and communities.”). 
69 Taskin, 2004-X 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50, 1148; Öneryildiz, 2004-XII 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20, 359. 
70 Rio Declaration, supra note 1, at Principle 15 (stating, “the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”). Although it is far from evident that the precautionary 
approach as articulated here either has or could have the necessary normative character to constitute a rule 
of law, it has been relied on by international tribunals as a general principle, which should be taken into 
account when interpreting treaties. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Aust. v. Japan) 
(Provisional Measures), 38 I.L.M. 1624, 1634 (1999); see also Id. (separate opinions by Judge Laing at 
1641; Judge Treves at 1645)); see also Andre Nollkaemper, What You Risk Reveals What You Value, in 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 80 
(David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996). 
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in each of these cases left no room for such a defence. This breach of domestic law 
necessarily constitutes a violation of the Convention.71  States cannot expect to 
persuade the European Court that the needs of the community can best be met in such 
cases by not enforcing the law.  A fortiori, if a national supreme court has weighed the 
rights involved and annulled a permit for a harmful activity on the ground that it does 
not serve the public interest, the European Court is not going to reverse this judgment 
in favour of a national government.72  Thirdly, the beneficiaries of this duty to 
regulate and control sources of environmental harm are not the community at large, 
still less the environment per se, but only those individuals whose rights will be 
affected by any failure to act.  The duty is not one of protecting the environment, but 
one of protecting humans from significantly harmful environmental impacts.73  
 
2.2   Access to and Provision of Environmental Information 
 
Article 10 of the European Convention only guarantees freedom to receive and impart 
information. It creates neither a right of access to information nor a duty to 
communicate information.74  On the other hand securing a right of access to 
environmental information is an important feature of contemporary European 
environmental law, both in EU law75 and under the Aarhus Convention.76  
 
“Environmental information” is broadly defined in the latter Convention and includes 
information concerning the physical elements of the environment such as water and 
biological diversity, as well as information about activities, administrative measures, 
agreements, policies, legislation, plans, and programs likely to affect the environment, 
human health, safety or conditions of life. Cost benefit and other economic analyses and 
assumptions used in environmental decision-making are also included.   
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Fadeyeva, 2005-IV 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10. 
72 Taskin, 2004-X 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50, 1148 (holding ‘[i]n the instant case, the Court notes that the 
authorities' decision to issue a permit to the Ovacik gold mine was annulled by the Supreme 
Administrative Court…After weighing the competing interests in the present case against each other, 
the latter based its decision on the applicants' effective enjoyment of the right to life and the right to a 
healthy environment and concluded that the permit did not serve the public interest…In view of that 
conclusion, no other examination of the material aspect of the case with regard to the margin of 
appreciation generally allowed to the national authorities in this area is necessary.’). 
73 See Kyrtatos v. Greece, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 16, 399 (2003). 
74 Guerra, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 381. 
75 See e.g., Council Directive 2003/4, 2003 O.J. (L 041) (EC).  
76 Aarhus Convention, supra note 24, at art. 4, 5. 
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Rights of access are extended to NGOs “promoting environmental protection” in 
accordance with national law.  There are detailed provisions, consistent for the most part 
with EC law, regarding access to and collection of environmental information. Access to 
information is also supported by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe.77  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has responded to these developments by ruling 
that information about environmental risks must be available to those likely to be 
affected.78  In Öneryildiz, the Court placed “particular emphasis” on the public’s right 
to information about dangerous activities which posed a threat to life.79  Moreover, 
where governments engage in dangerous activities with unknown consequences for 
health, such as nuclear tests, there is a duty to establish an “effective and accessible” 
procedure for allowing those involved to obtain relevant information.80  Guerra shows 
that a failure to provide for access to information may also violate the right to private 
life.81  
 
In all these situations the essential point is to enable individuals to assess the 
environmental risks to which they are exposed.82 This right to information arises not 
under Article 10 of the ECHR, but under Articles 2 and 8 or Protocol No. 1 as the 
case may be.83  It is thus the risk to life, health, private life or property which 
generates the requirement to provide information, not some broader concern for 
                                                 
77 EUR. PARL. DEB. (03) 1614 (stating, “[t]he Assembly recommends that the Governments of member 
States: (i) ensure appropriate protection of the life, health, family and private life, physical integrity and 
private property of persons in accordance with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and by Article 1 of its Additional Protocol, by also taking particular account of the need 
for environmental protection; (ii) recognise a human right to a healthy, viable and decent environment 
which includes the objective obligation for states to protect the environment, in national laws, 
preferably at constitutional level; (iii) safeguard the individual procedural rights to access to 
information, public participation in decision making and access to justice in environmental matters set 
out in the Aarhus Convention…”). 
78 See Taskin, 2004-X 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50, 1148 (referring to the Aarhus Convention, Principle 10 of 
the Rio Declaration and the 2003 Council of Europe Recommendation). 
79 Öneryildiz, 2004-XII 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20. 
80 McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1(1999). 
81 See Andre Nollkaemper, What You Risk Reveals What You Value, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 80 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey 
eds., 1996). 
82 See e.g., McGinley & Egan, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; See also, EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB. 55th Sess.  1614 ¶ 40 
(2003).  
83 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 21, at § I, art. 10; See also, Protocol I to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1952). 
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environmental governance, transparency of decision-making, or public participation.  
It follows that the right to environmental information in ECHR cases is more 
restricted than the broader requirements of the Aarhus Convention.  Access to 
information in the latter case is not dependent on being personally affected or having 
some right or interest in the matter, still less does it apply only to those who are 
“victims of a violation” of convention rights.  Everyone is entitled to environmental 
information covered by the Aarhus Convention.84 
 
Despite these limitations, the ECHR jurisprudence on environmental 
information is in one important sense potentially more extensive than under more 
general access to information laws: in appropriate cases it can include a duty to 
inform, not simply a right of access.  In Guerra, Italy’s failure to provide “essential 
information” about the severity and nature of toxic emissions from a chemical plant 
was held to constitute a breach of the right to private life.85  The judgment notes that 
the applicants were “particularly exposed to danger” in the event of an accident at the 
factory, and there had also been a violation of Italian legislation requiring that 
information concerning hazardous activities be made public.  Unlike other decisions 
this case seems to assume that the state must actively inform those affected, not 
merely that it must have a procedure for obtaining information if requested.  This 
stronger formulation makes sense where the situation involves an imminent and 
serious risk to life or health: simply leaving it to those who may suffer injury to seek 
out information about such risks could not possibly fulfil the state’s duty in such cases 
to protect the public.86  The Aarhus Convention also recognises a duty to inform, 
which it formulates in terms requiring an imminent threat.87  Once again we can see a 
                                                 
84 Aarhus Convention, supra note 24, at art. 4(1)(a). 
85 Guerra, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 382. 
86 See LCB v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 212 (1999). 
87 Art. 5(1)(c) (stating, “[i]n the event of any imminent threat to human health or the environment, 
whether caused by human activities or due to natural causes, all information which could enable the 
public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm arising from the threat and is held by a public 
authority [shall be] disseminated immediately and without delay to members of the public who may be 
affected.”). See also the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Prevention of Trans-
boundary Harm, art. 13, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third 
Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10) [hereinafter I.L.C. Draft Articles] (stating, “[s]tates concerned 
shall, by such means as are appropriate, provide the public likely to be affected by an activity within 
the scope of the present articles with relevant information relating to that activity, the risk involved and 
the harm which might result and ascertain their views.”). Note that for the purposes of this provision it 
appears to be immaterial whether the affected public is wholly or partly located in some other state.  
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very close correspondence between the Court’s case law and the 1998 Convention, 
which at the time of the Guerra decision was still under negotiation.  
 
2.3   Environmental protection as a legitimate aim  
 
Inevitably there will be circumstances where environmental objectives and the rights 
of particular individuals or groups may come into conflict.  Establishing wildlife 
reserves, or regulating polluting activities, or controlling resource extraction, for 
example, may impair the use or value of property, hamper economic development, or 
restrict the right of indigenous peoples to make traditional use of natural resources.  In 
extreme cases environmental regulation may amount to a taking of property or an 
interference with private and family life, entitling the owner to compensation.88 
Particularly in cases involving alleged interference by the state with peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions and property, the Strasbourg court has consistently taken 
the view that environmental protection is a legitimate objective of public policy.  It 
has refused to give undue pre-eminence to property rights, despite their supposedly 
protected status under the First Protocol.  Regulation in the public interest is not 
inconsistent with the terms of the protocol, provided it is authorised by law and 
proportionate to a legitimate aim, such as environmental protection.89  
 
Fundamental to the Court’s environmental case law is the balancing of interests that 
must often take place when environmental matters are involved.  Obvious questions 
often posed in this context are whether human rights law trumps environmental law, 
or whether environmental rights trump the right of states to pursue economic 
development.  Such potential conflicts have not led international courts to employ the 
concept of ius cogens or to give human rights or the right to sustainable development 
automatic priority.  Instead, the case law has concentrated on questions of balance, 
necessity, and the degree of interference.  It shows very clearly that few rights are 
ever absolute or unqualified. In consequence it has proved relatively easy for 
international tribunals to accommodate human rights, environmental law and 
                                                 
88 See Sporrong & Lonnroth v. Sweden., 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 35 (1982). 
89 Fredin v. Sweden, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 784, 792-95 (1991). See also Mahuika v. New Zealand 
CCPR/C/70/547/1993 (2000) (upholding the state’s right to conserve and manage natural resources in 
the interests of future generations provided they did not amount to a denial of the applicant’s rights.). 
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economic development.  The ICJ’s decision in the Pulp Mills Case illustrates the 
essentially relative character of these competing interests.90 As the Court held there:  
Whereas the present case highlights the importance of the need to ensure 
environmental protection of shared natural resources while allowing for 
sustainable economic development; whereas it is in particular necessary to 
bear in mind the reliance of the Parties on the quality of the water of the River 
Uruguay for their livelihood and economic development; whereas from this 
point of view account must be taken of the need to safeguard the continued 
conservation of the river environment and the rights of economic development 
of the riparian States . . .91  
 
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights92 and the UN Human 
Rights Committee93 have taken a similar approach in cases concerning logging, oil 
extraction and mining on land belonging to indigenous peoples. 
 In cases before the European Court of Human Rights, states have been allowed 
a wide margin of appreciation to pursue environmental objectives provided they 
maintain a fair balance between the general interests of the community and the 
protection of the individual's fundamental rights.94 On this basis the Court has in 
several cases upheld restrictions on property development.95 A similarly wide 
                                                 
90 Pulp Mills Case (Provisional Measures) (Arg. v. Uru.), 2006 I.C.J. 13 (July 13). 
91 Id. at 46.  See also Case Concerning the Gabíkovo-Nagymaros Dam, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 156 (Sept. 25).  
92 See Maya Indigenous Cmty. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5, rev. 1 at 727 (2004)(noting, “[t]his Commission similarly 
acknowledges the importance of economic development for the prosperity of the populations of this 
Hemisphere. As proclaimed in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, ‘[t]he promotion and 
observance of economic, social, and cultural rights are inherently linked to integral development, 
equitable economic growth, and to the consolidation of democracy of the states of the Hemisphere.’ At 
the same time, development activities must be accompanied by appropriate and effective measures to 
ensure that they do not proceed at the expense of the fundamental rights of persons who may be 
particularly and negatively affected, including indigenous communities and the environment upon 
which they depend for their physical, cultural and spiritual well-being.”). 
93 See Ilmari Lansman v. Finland, United Nations Human Rights Comm., Commc’n. No. 511/92, 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 ¶ 9.4 (1994) (“A State may understandably wish to encourage development or 
allow economic activity by enterprises. The scope of its freedom to do so is not to be assessed by 
reference to a margin of appreciation, but by reference to the obligations it has undertaken in article 27. 
Article 27 requires that a member of a minority shall not be denied his right to enjoy his culture. Thus, 
measures whose impact amount to a denial of the right will not be compatible with the obligations 
under article 27. However, measures that have a certain limited impact on the way of life of persons 
belonging to a minority will not necessarily amount to a denial of the right under article 27.” The 
Committee concluded that Finland had taken adequate measures to minimise the impact on reindeer 
herding). See also Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (finding that the impact of 
oil and gas extraction on the applicants’ traditional subsistence economy constituted a violation of 
Article 27.). 
94 See Fredin, supra note 89. 
95 See e.g., Pine Valley Devs. Ltd. v. Ireland, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, 334 (1991); 
Katsoulis and ors v Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). Contra Matos e Silva Ltd. v. 
Kapsalis & Nima-
Kapsali v. Greece
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discretion has enabled European states to pursue economic development, provided the 
rights of individuals to private and family life or protection of possessions and 
property are sufficiently balanced against economic benefits for the community as a 
whole. Thus, in Hatton v. United Kingdom,96 additional night flights at Heathrow 
Airport did not violate the right to private and family life because adequate measures 
had been taken to soundproof homes, to regulate and limit the frequency of flights and 
to assess the environmental impact.97  Moreover there was no evidence of any fall in 
the value of the homes concerned, and the applicants could have moved elsewhere 
had they chosen to do so.98  In the court’s view the state would be failing in its duty to 
those affected if it did not regulate or mitigate environmental nuisances or 
environmental risk caused by such development projects,99 but it is required to do so 
only to the extent necessary to protect life, health, enjoyment of property and family 
life from disproportionate interference.100  The United Kingdom had acted lawfully, 
had done its best to mitigate the impact on the private life of those affected and, in the 
view of the Court, it had maintained a fair balance between the economic benefit of 
the community as a whole and the rights of individuals who lived near the airport.101 
Had the applicants demonstrated serious health effects or a risk to life the outcome 
might have been different: where the right to life is engaged the degree of balancing 
permitted will inevitably be much less. 102 
 
 
It should also be noted that the first instance chamber and the dissenting 
judges in the Grand Chamber decided in favor of the applicants on the basis that the 
UK had not demonstrated the value of night flights, and had neither adequately 
assessed the noise impact nor mitigated its effects sufficiently.103 The noise nuisance 
                                                                                                                                            
Portugal, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 573 (1997) (finding restrictions on property to be 
unnecessary). 
96 Hatton v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (2003). 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 643.  
99 Id. See also Öneryildiz, 2004-XII 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20, 364; Taskin, 2004-X 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50, 
1148. 
100 Hatton v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28.   
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
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thus constituted, in their view, a violation of the right to private life.104 Clearly there 
can be different views on what constitutes a fair balance between economic interests 
and individual rights, and such a judgment is inevitably subjective. However, the 
Grand Chamber’s approach suggests a rather greater deference towards government 
policy than at first instance, with inevitable consequences for environmental 
protection.105 The important point in the present context is that the Grand Chamber 
leaves little room for the Court to substitute its own view of the extent to which the 
environment should be protected from economic development.106 On this basis, 
decisions about where the public interest lies are for politicians, not for the court, save 
in the most extreme cases. This approach cannot easily be reconciled with protecting a 
substantive right to a decent environment.  
 
At the same time, the balance of interests to be maintained in such cases is not 
only a substantive one, but also has important procedural dimensions. Thus in Taskin 
v. Turkey, a case about the licensing of a mine, the Court held that “whilst Article 8 
contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process leading to 
measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests 
of the individual as safeguarded by Article 8.”107 This passage and the Court’s 
emphasis on taking into account the views of affected individuals strongly suggests 
that, at least for some decisions, participation in the decision-making process by those 
affected will be essential for compliance with Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights108, as it will also for compliance with Article 6 of the Aarhus 
Convention.109 Similarly, the right to “meaningful consultation” is upheld by the Inter 
                                                 
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107Taskin, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 1149. 
108 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 21, at art. 8 (stating “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. . . . [t]here shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the 
law.”). 
109Aarhus Convention, supra note 24, at art. 6 (stating participatory rights are available only to “the 
public concerned”, defined in art. 2(5) as “the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an 
interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental 
organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law 
shall be deemed to have an interest.”). 
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American Commission in the Maya Indigenous Community of Toledo Case,110 and by 
the African commission in the Ogoniland Case.111 
 
As with access to information, however, the ECHR right of participation in decision-
making is not available to everyone, nor does it apply to decisions concerning the 
environment in general.112 Only those whose rights are in some way affected will 
benefit from this protection.113 This again is significantly narrower than under the 
Aarhus Convention, which extends participation rights to anyone having an “interest” 
in the decision, including NGOs.114 If Aarhus can therefore be viewed as promoting 
public interest participation, the ECHR case law remains firmly grounded in 
individual rights. It is likely to prove much harder to influence the outcome of any 
balancing of interests from this perspective. 
 
Nevertheless, the most significant feature of Taskin is that it envisages an informed 
process. The Court put the matter like this: “Where a State must determine complex 
issues of environmental and economic policy, the decision-making process must firstly 
involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to allow them to predict and 
evaluate in advance the effects of those activities which might damage the 
environment and infringe individuals' rights and to enable them to strike a fair balance 
between the various conflicting interests at stake.”115  The words environmental 
impact assessment are not used, but in many cases that is exactly what will be 
necessary to give effect to the evaluation process envisaged here.  This is a far-
                                                 
110 Maya Indigenous Cmty. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Case 12.053, Report No. 
40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004) ¶¶ 154-55. The Commission relies inter alia on 
the right to life and the right to private life, in addition to finding consultation a “fundamental 
component of the State’s obligations in giving effect to the communal property right of the Maya 
people in the lands that they have traditionally used and occupied.” See also ILO Convention No. 169 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1991, at 1436 (1992) and the 
UN Human Rights Comm. decision in Ilmari Lansman v. Finland. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 ¶ 9.5, 
(stressing the need “to ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in 
decisions which affect them.”). 
111 Supra note 13. 
112 It is possible, however, that art. 2(5) of the Aarhus Convention might enable NGOs to claim 
participatory rights under art 8 of the ECHR. Contra art. 8(1) of the 2003 UNECE Protocol on 
Strategic Environmental Assessment, under which ‘Each party shall ensure early, timely and effective 
opportunities for public participation, when all options are open, in the strategic environmental 
assessment of plans and programmes.’ The public for this purpose includes relevant NGOs. 
113 Aarhus Convention, supra note 24.  
114 Id. at art. 6.  
115Taskin, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶119. 
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reaching conclusion, but once again, it reflects the Aarhus Convention. Article 6 of the 
Aarhus Convention also does not specify what kind of procedure is required, but it has 
detailed provisions on the information to be made available, including:  
(a) A description of the site and the physical and technical 
characteristics of the proposed activity, including an estimate of the 
expected residues and emissions; 
(b) A description of the significant effects of the proposed activity 
on the environment; 
(c)  A description of the measures envisaged to prevent and/or 
reduce the effects, including emissions; 
(d)  A non-technical summary of the above; 
(e)  An outline of the main alternatives studied by the applicant.116 
 
As a brief comparison with Annex II of the 1991 Espoo Convention on EIA shows, 
these are all matters normally included in an EIA.117 
 
 Like the Ogoniland  and Maya Indigenous Community cases, Taskin thus 
suggests that what existing international law has most to offer with regard to 
environmental protection is the empowerment of individuals and groups most affected 
by environmental problems, and for whom the opportunity to participate in decisions is 
the most useful and direct means of influencing the balance of environmental, social and 
economic interests.118  From this perspective, the case law espousing participatory rights 
for indigenous peoples appears simply as a particular manifestation of a broader 
principle.119  
 
 Finally, the Taskin judgment stipulates that “the individuals concerned must 
also be able to appeal to the courts against any decision, act or omission where they 
consider that their interests or their comments have not been given sufficient weight in 
the decision-making process.”120  This too reflects the requirements of the Aarhus 
Convention with regard to access to justice.121  Following Rio Principle 10,122  Article 
                                                 
116 Aarhus Convention, supra note 24, at art. 6(6). 
117 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-boundary Context, 
Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 802, available at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/eia.htm [hereinafter Espoo 
Convention, at Annex II (including an indication of predictive methods, underlying assumptions, 
relevant data, gaps in knowledge and uncertainties, as well as an outline of monitoring plans).  
118 See Taskin, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R.1148. 
119 See e.g., Pine Valley Devs. Ltd., App. No. 12742/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57-9 (1991); Kapsalis & Nima-
Kapsali, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). Contra Matos e Silva Ltd., 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 573 (1997).  
120 Taskin, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 119. 
121 Aarhus Convention, supra note 24, at art. 9(2). 
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9 of the Aarhus Convention makes provisions for individuals to challenge breaches of 
national law relating to the environment when either their rights are impaired or they 
have a “sufficient interest.”123  Adequate, fair and effective remedies must be provided. 
This article looks very much like an application of the decisions in Lopez Ostra and 
Guerra referred to earlier.124  Insofar as it empowers claimants with a “sufficient 
interest” to engage in public interest litigation when their own rights are not affected,125  
however, Article 9 of Aarhus may go beyond the requirements of Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR. To that extent, there is another significant difference between the two treaties.  
 
 If Hatton shows a reluctance on the part of the Court to grapple with the merits 
of a decision interfering with individual rights, Taskin convincingly demonstrates an 
unequivocal willingness to address the proper procedures for taking decisions relating 
to the environment in human rights terms. This is a profound extension of the scope of 
Article 8 of the European Convention. It goes far to translate into European human 
rights law the procedural requirements set out in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
and elaborated in European environmental treaty law, despite the fact that Turkey is 
not a party to the Aarhus Convention. On this evidence the European Convention on 
Human Rights is not merely a living instrument but an exceptionally vibrant one, with 
a very extensive evolutionary character. At the same time, however, the broader 
public interest approach of the Aarhus Convention and the narrower ECHR focus on 
the rights of affected individuals are very evident in the case law considered above. 
This distinction has important implications for any debate about the need for an 
                                                                                                                                            
122 Rio Declaration, supra note 1, at Principle 10. 
123 Aarhus Convention, supra note 24, at art. 9. 
124 Lopez Ostra, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277; Guerra, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357; See also Zander v. Sweden, ECHR 
Sers. A, No. 279B (1993).  But see Balmer-Schafroth v. Switzerland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 598 (1997) (the 
majority of the Court took a restrictive view of the applicants’ standing). 
125 “Sufficient interest” is not defined by the Convention but the phrase is drawn from English 
administrative law. See Chris Hilson & Ian Cram, Judicial Review and Environmental Law - Is there a 
coherent view of standing?, 16 LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1996). In its first ruling, the Aarhus Compliance 
Committee held that ‘Although what constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be 
determined in accordance with national law, it must be decided “with the objective of giving the public 
concerned wide access to justice” within the scope of the Convention.’ They are not required to establish 
an actio popularis, but they must not use national law ‘as an excuse for introducing or maintaining so 
strict criteria that they effectively bar all or almost all environmental organizations from challenging 
acts or omissions that contravene national law relating to the environment.’ See UNECE, Compliance 
Committee, Bond Beter Leefmilieu Vlaanderen VZW- Findings and Recommendation with regard to 
compliance by Belgium (Comm.ACCC/C/2005/11) ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2006/4/Add.2 (28 July 2006) 
paras. 33 - 36. 
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autonomous right to a decent or satisfactory environment, a question to which we 
return in the final section.    
 
2.4 Trans-boundary application 
 
 International human rights treaties generally require a state party to secure the 
relevant rights and freedoms for everyone within its own territory or subject to its 
jurisdiction.126  At first sight, this may suggest that a state cannot be held responsible for 
violating the rights of persons in other countries, but the European Court of Human 
Rights has in several cases held states responsible for extra-territorial effects.127  In 
Cyprus v. Turkey the Court re-affirmed that “the responsibility of Contracting States can 
be involved by acts and omissions of their authorities which produce effects outside their 
own territory.”128 In this case, the question was whether the respondent state was 
responsible for the actions of its army of occupation in Northern Cyprus. Although the 
context of this and earlier cases is different from environmental disputes, they suggest 
that the Convention could arguably have extra-territorial application if a state's failure to 
control activities causing environmental harm affects life, private life or property in 
neighbouring countries. If states are responsible for their failure to control soldiers and 
judges abroad, a fortiori they should likewise be held responsible for a failure to control 
trans-boundary pollution and environmental harm emanating from industrial activities 
inside their own territory. These activities are within their jurisdiction in the obvious 
sense of being subject to their own law and administrative controls. Only the effects are 
extraterritorial. On this basis an application to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has been brought against Uruguay by a group of Argentine residents 
concerned about possible pollution risks from a pulp mill under construction adjacent to 
the River Uruguay.129 
 
                                                 
126 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 21; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, supra note 1, at art. 2. 
127 See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 29-30 (1995); Drozd and Janousek v. France & Spain, 
240 Eur. Ct. H.R.,1, 29 (1992); J.G. Merrills and A.H. Robertson, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 23-28 
(4th ed., Juris Publishing 2001).  Contra Bankovic and Others v. Belgium, 2002-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 
(holding inadmissible a trans-boundary claim brought against NATO states in respect of the bombing 
of Serbia).  
128 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 24. 
129 Based on author’s personal knowledge. At the time of writing no decision had been taken on 
admissibility.  
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 Similarly, it would not be unreasonable to expect one state to take into account 
trans-boundary impacts in another state when balancing the wider public interest against 
the possible harm to individual rights.130  There is no principled basis for suggesting that 
the outcome of cases such as Hatton should depend on whether those affected by the 
noise are in the same country, or in other countries. From this it also follows that 
representations from those affected in other countries should be taken into account and 
given due weight.131  
 
 A further important development in trans-boundary rights is the codification by 
the International Law Commission of a principle of non-discrimination in Article 15 of 
the 2001 Articles on Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm132 and Article 32 of the 
1997 UN Watercourses Convention.133 Equality of access to trans-boundary remedies 
and procedures is based on the principle of non-discrimination:134 where domestic 
remedies are already available to deal with internal pollution or environmental problems, 
international or regional law can be used to ensure that the benefit of these remedies and 
procedures is extended to trans-boundary claimants. As defined by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”),135 equal access and non-
                                                 
130 See Report of the International Law Association, Committee on Transnational Enforcement of 
Environmental Law, ILA Final Report 4-5 (2006), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/html/layout_ 
committee.htm. 
131 Ibid. See also Article 13 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, note 63 
above. 
132 Id.  See also ILC Draft Articles, supra note 87, at art. 15 (“[A] State shall not discriminate on the 
basis of nationality or residence or place where the injury might occur, in granting to such persons, in 
accordance with its legal system, access to judicial or other procedures to seek protection or other 
appropriate redress.”). 
133 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 32, G.A. 
Res. 51/229, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1997), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf. (“[A] watercourse State 
shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place where the injury occurred, in 
granting to such persons, in accordance with its legal system, access to judicial or other procedures, or 
a right to claim compensation or other relief in respect of significant harm caused by such activities 
carried on in its territory.”). 
134 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that “the fundamental principle of equality and 
non-discrimination forms part of general international law, because it is applicable to all States, 
regardless of whether or not they are a party to a specific international treaty. At the current stage of the 
development of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has 
entered the domain of jus cogens.”  See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, 
2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, at 113 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_18_ing.pdf. 
135 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendations of the Council on 
Principles concerning Trans-frontier Pollution, OECD Doc. C (74) 224, C (76) 55, C (77) 28 (Nov. 21, 
1974), in OECD, OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Paris, 1986), available at 
http://webdomino1.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(74)224.  See generally Ernst Willheim, 
Private Remedies for Trans-frontier Environmental Damage, 7 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L LAW 174 (1976); 
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discrimination should ensure that any person who has suffered trans-boundary 
environmental damage, or who is exposed to a significant risk of such damage, obtains at 
least equivalent treatment to that afforded to individuals in the country of origin. This 
includes the provision of and access to information concerning environmental risks; 
participation in hearings, preliminary enquiries and the opportunity to make objections; 
and resort to administrative and judicial procedures in order to prevent pollution, secure 
its abatement or obtain compensation.  These rights of equal access are to be accorded 
not only to individuals affected by the risk of trans-frontier injury but also to foreign 
NGOs and public authorities, insofar as comparable entities possess such rights in the 
country of origin of the pollution.  
 
 Although the Aarhus Convention does not specifically require non-
discriminatory trans-boundary application, its provisions apply in quite general terms to 
“‘the public”’ or “the public concerned,” without distinguishing between those inside the 
state and others beyond its borders. In accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties it seems quite plausible to suggest that the 
Aarhus Convention must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of non-
discrimination.136 Even if that were not the case, a more important argument is that 
European Convention Rights “must be secured without discrimination on any 
ground.”137  Given that the principal elements of the Aarhus Convention have now been 
incorporated into the European Convention on Human Rights through case law, it 
follows that they too must be secured in accordance with Article 14.  
 
 To deny trans-boundary claimants the protection of the Convention when 
otherwise appropriate would be hard to reconcile with standards of equality of access to 
justice and non-discriminatory treatment required by these precedents. Available 
national procedures would have to be exhausted before any human rights claims could 
be brought, but there is little point requiring that national remedies be made available to 
trans-boundary claimants if they cannot resort to human rights law when necessary to 
compel the state to enforce its own laws or to take adequate account of extra-territorial 
                                                                                                                                            
OECD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANS-FRONTIER POLLUTION (Paris, 1977); Henri Smets, Le principe de non-
discrimination en matière de protection de l’environnement, in REVUE EUROPÉENNE DU DROIT DE 
L'ENVIRONNEMENT 1 (2000). 
136 See Jonas Ebbesson, The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law, 8 Y.B. 
INT'L ENV’T. L. 51, 84-85 (1997). 
137 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 21, at art. 14; See also id. at Protocol 12. 
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effects. Given that trans-boundary claimants may have to subject themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the state causing the damage when seeking redress for environmental 
harm, it seems entirely consistent with the case-law and the “living instrument” 
conception of the European Convention on Human Rights to conclude that a state party 
must balance the rights of persons in other states against its own economic benefit, and 
must adopt and enforce environmental protection laws for their benefit, as well as for the 
protection of its own population.138  
 
 As studies for the ILA and the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law139 have shown, greater coherence in the public and private international law 
aspects is desirable if environmental rights are to be made effective across borders. 
Moreover, the increasing international emphasis on free movement of goods, capital 
and investment has not yet been matched by a willingness to address the 
accountability of multinational corporations for environmental and human rights 
abuses in developing countries. Nevertheless, cases such as Lubbe v. Cape indicate 
how national conflict of laws rules which have hitherto shielded business are 
beginning to yield to human rights and access to justice concerns in novel and 
important ways that have implications for future environmental litigation.140  
 
3. Conclusions: A right to a decent or satisfactory environment? 
 
 The case law of the ECHR clearly demonstrates how much environmental 
protection can be extracted from existing human rights law without creating 
specifically environmental rights. In particular, we can see that the convention fully 
guarantees everything a right to a healthy environment would normally be thought to 
cover. Secondly, through evolutionary interpretation it also guarantees the main 
procedural requirements of the Aarhus Convention, including in various ways the 
rights of access to environmental information and public participation in decision-
making. In that sense environmental rights are already entrenched in European human 
                                                 
138 See ILA Final Report, supra note 130. 
139 Christophe Bernasconi, Civil Liability Resulting from Trans-frontier Environmental Damage: A Case 
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rights law, as they are also in the African Charter and the Inter-American convention. 
The European, African and Inter-american precedents are clearly relevant to the 
interpretation of comparable rights in global human rights conventions, and Principle 
10 of the Rio Declaration would also sustain reading into them the procedural 
requirements found in the Aarhus Convention. Judge Higgins has drawn attention to 
the way human rights courts ‘work consciously to co-ordinate their approaches.’141 
There is certainly evidence of convergence in the case-law and a cross-fertilisation of 
ideas between the different human right systems,142 so Taskin v. Turkey will most 
probably become a significant case not merely within European human rights law but 
globally. Nevertheless, as Hayward points out, “Procedural rights alone do little to 
counterbalance the prevailing presumptions in favour of development and economic 
interests.”143 As we have also seen, ECHR procedural rights are available only to 
those affected. They do not facilitate the kind of public interest activism contemplated 
by the Aarhus Convention. 
 
 Despite its evolutionary character, therefore, the European Convention still 
falls short of guaranteeing a right to a decent or satisfactory environment if that 
concept is understood in broader, essentially qualitative, terms unrelated to impacts on 
humans. It remains true, as the Court reiterated in Kyrtatos, that “neither Article 8 nor 
any of the other articles of the Convention are specifically designed to provide general 
protection of the environment as such….”144 This case involved the illegal draining of 
a wetland. Although the applicants were successful insofar as the state’s non-
enforcement of a court judgment was concerned, the European Court could find no 
violation of their right to private life or enjoyment of property arising out of the 
                                                 
141 R.Higgins, A Babel of Judical Voices?, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.. 791, 798 (2006). 
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destruction of the area in question. Although they lived nearby, the applicants’ rights 
were not affected. They were not entitled to live in any particular environment, or to 
have the surrounding environment indefinitely preserved, although, as Judge 
Loucaides has argued, it would have been possible to include their surroundings 
within a broader interpretation of the words “home” or “private life” in Article 8 of 
the Convention. 145 
 
 The Court’s conclusion in Kyrtatos points to a larger issue, which goes to the 
heart of the problem: human rights protection benefits only the victims of a violation 
of convention rights. If the individual applicant’s health, private life, property or civil 
rights are not sufficiently affected by environmental loss, then he or she has no 
standing to proceed. There is, as Judge Loucaides has observed, no actio popularis 
under the European convention.146 The Inter American Commission on Human Rights 
has taken a similar view, rejecting as inadmissible a claim on behalf of all the citizens 
of Panama to protect a nature reserve from development.147 In a comparable case 
concerning objections to the growing of genetically modified crops the UN Human 
Rights Committee likewise held that “no person may, in theoretical terms and by actio 
popularis, object to a law or practice which he holds to be at variance with the 
Covenant.”148  
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 This approach appears to rule out public interest litigation by individuals or 
NGOs in environmental cases under all of the relevant human rights treaties. Even 
those individuals who are victims of violations cannot ask a human rights court or the 
UN Human Rights Committee to decide in favour of environmental protection merely 
because they believe that is where the public interest is best served. They can only ask 
it to weigh their own rights against the public interest in some other value such as 
trade or development. In so doing they may secure some victories for environmental 
protection, but these will be incidental consequences, not the result of any broader 
commitment to a particular kind of environment.  
 
 Should we then go the whole way and create such a right? A right to a 
satisfactory or decent environment would be less anthropocentric than the present law. 
It would benefit society as a whole, not just individual victims. It would enable 
litigants and NGOs to challenge environmentally destructive or unsustainable 
development on public interest grounds. It would give environmental concerns greater 
weight in competition with other rights.149 At the same time, definitional problems are 
inherent in any attempt to postulate environmental rights in qualitative terms. The virtue 
of looking at environmental protection through other human rights, such as life, private 
life or property, is that it focuses attention on what matters most: the detriment to 
important, internationally protected values from uncontrolled environmental harm. This 
is an approach which avoids the need to define such notions as a satisfactory or decent 
environment, falls well within the competence of human rights courts, and involves little 
or no potential for conflict with international environmental institutions or treaty COPs. 
 
 What constitutes a satisfactory, decent or ecologically sound environment is 
bound to suffer from uncertainty. At best, it may result in cultural relativism, particularly 
from a North-South perspective, and lack the universal value normally thought to be 
inherent in human rights. Indeterminacy is an important reason, it is often argued, for not 
rushing to embrace new rights without considering their implications.150 Moreover, there 
is little international consensus on the correct terminology. Even the UN Sub-
Commission could not make up its mind, referring variously to the right to a "healthy 
                                                 
149 See generally J. Merrills, Environmental Rights, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 666 (D.Bodansky, J.Brunnée and E.Hey eds, 2007). 
150 Alston, supra note 2; Handl, supra note 53. 
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and flourishing environment" or to a "satisfactory environment" in its report and to the 
right to a "secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment" in the draft principles. 
Other formulations are equally diverse. Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration talks of 
an "environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well being", while Article 
24 of the African Charter on refers to a "general satisfactory environment favourable to 
their development". What any of these mean is largely a subjective value judgment. An 
option preferred by Kiss and Shelton is to accept the impossibility of defining an ideal 
environment in abstract terms, but to let human rights supervisory institutions and courts 
develop their own interpretations, as they have done for many other human rights.151  
 
 But do we want courts deciding such cases? Even if definition is possible, does 
it follow that international courts are the best bodies to perform this task, rather than 
national political institutions? Should we let judges determine whether to preserve the 
habitat of the lesser-spotted woodpecker or the Barton Springs Salamander instead of 
extending an airport or a shopping mall? Here the distinction between Hatton and 
Taskin is important. The first shows understandable reluctance to allow the European 
Court to become a forum for appeals against the policy judgments of governments, 
provided they do not disproportionately affect individual rights. The second shows a 
far greater willingness to insist that decisions are made by public authorities following 
proper procedures involving adequate information, public participation and access to 
judicial review. This is a tenable, and democratically defensible distinction, especially 
resonant in Western Europe and North America. One would expect most judges of the 
European Court of Human Rights to be comfortable with it. Whether it is equally 
defensible in other societies elsewhere in the world is more questionable. On the one 
hand, the willingness of Indian and African judges in environmental cases to go 
further than any European or American court is evidence of a different attitude to the 
relationship of government and the judiciary that is not likely to be replicated in 
Strasbourg, but which reflects the particular circumstances of Indian democracy or the 
African Charter.152 Given the evidence of unsustainable use of resources it is not 
surprising that some decisions of the African commission and the Inter-American 
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commission go well beyond the more limited greening of convention rights embraced 
by the European Court.  
 
 If we do take the view that judges are not the right people to decide on what 
constitutes a decent or satisfactory environment, is there then no role for international 
human rights law in this debate?  Here the obvious alternative is to revert to the 
second model of human rights law canvassed at the beginning: economic, social and 
cultural rights. These rights are generally concerned with encouraging governments to 
pursue policies which create conditions of life enabling individuals, or in some cases 
groups, to develop to their full potential. They are programmatic, requiring progressive 
realization in accordance with available resources, but nevertheless requiring states to 
“ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights.” 153  Compliance is normally monitored only by committees of independent 
experts,154 rather than by litigation through commissions and courts. The 1966 ESCR 
Covenant thus lacks the individual petition procedure through which the UN Human 
Rights Committee supervises compliance with the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. 
One problem with this approach is the ‘built-in defects’ of the monitoring process, 
including poor reporting and excessive deference to states.155 But insofar as the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does have some influence over 
governments, and can take into account agreed environmental standards, this model at 
least provides a mechanism for balancing environmental concerns against competing 
objectives.156 Another problem is the narrowness of ESCR Covenant Article 12, with its 
focus on health and “environmental hygiene.” A great deal obviously depends on how 
the right to health is interpreted and applied. According to General Comment No.14, 
Article 12 includes ‘the requirement to ensure an adequate supply of safe and potable 
water and basic sanitation; the prevention and reduction of the population's exposure 
to harmful substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals or other detrimental 
                                                 
153 UNCESCR, General comment No.3: The Nature of States’ Parties Oblications (1990), interpreting 
Article 2 of the convenant.  See MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Oxford 1995). 
154  See Craven, supra note 153, at ch. 2. 
155 S.Leckie, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for change in a system 
needing reform, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 129 (P.Alston and 
J.Crawford eds, 2000). 
156 See Kiss & Shelton, supra note 151, at 173-78. 
  36 
environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health.’157 It is 
difficult to see what this adds over and above the case-law on environmental impacts on 
the right to life.  What is needed here is a broader focus on environmental quality, which 
could be balanced more directly against the covenant’s economic and developmental 
priorities.158 The problems of definition and judgment would still arise but, as in 
environmental treaty COPs, they could more readily be handled within a process of 
“constructive dialogue” with governments rather than through litigation in courts.159 
Since political processes of this kind are inherently multilateral and normally allow for 
more extensive NGO participation than international courts they also have a stronger 
claim to greater legitimacy. 
 
 This conclusion has several consequences for a potential right to a decent or 
satisfactory environment. As the internationalisation of the domestic environment 
becomes more extensive, through policies of sustainable development, protection of 
biodiversity, and mitigation of climate change, the role of human rights law in 
democratising national decision-making processes and making them more rational, 
open and legitimate will become more and not less significant. Public participation, as 
foreseen in UNCED Agenda 21, is thus a central element in sustainable development. 
The incorporation of Aarhus-style procedural rights into general human rights law 
significantly advances this objective.  So do the strong provisions on public and NGO 
participation adopted by European states in the 2003 Protocol on Strategic 
Environmental Assessment.160 They take the notion of public interest participation 
further even than the Aarhus Convention. This approach is entirely appropriate if what 
constitutes sustainable development and an acceptable environment is essentially a 
matter for each society to determine according to its own values and choices, albeit 
within the confines of internationally agreed rules and policies and subject to some 
degree of international oversight.  
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 What is most important then is to ensure the right processes for making this 
determination, both internally and internationally, rather than to define some vision of 
its substantive outcome. For this purpose the role of international human rights courts 
is important but limited to the protection of individual civil and political rights and ill-
suited to broader forms of public interest litigation for which national courts are better 
equipped.  Larger questions of economic and social welfare have been and should 
remain within the confines of the more political supervisory processes envisaged by 
the ESCR Covenant and the European Social Charter. At the substantive level, a 
“right” to a decent or satisfactory environment can best be envisaged within that 
context, but at present it remains largely absent from the relevant global and regional 
treaties.  This is an omission which can and should be addressed if environmental 
considerations are to receive the weight they deserve in the balance of economic, 
social and cultural rights. 
 
